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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 42 SPRING 2006 NUMBER 2
EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF EFFECTIVENESS &
AUTONOMY IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
JUSTIN F. MARCEAU*
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowhere is the question of what constitutes ethical representation'
more relevant than in determining whether a client in a criminal case
received constitutionally adequate representation under the Sixth
Amendment. Historically, there has been a remarkable shortage of
professional or legal guidance regarding the proper allocation of deci-
sion-making authority between the client and the lawyer.' Capitaliz-
ing on the professional uncertainty as to the proper allocation of au-
thority, prosecutors have argued alternately that the client-centered3
Mr. Marceau received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2004 and is currently
working as an associate in the San Francisco office of Heller Ehrman LLP.
1. Ethical representation is representation consistent with the prevailing norms of the
profession. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (declaring the standard
to be "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms").
2. Available sources of guidance include Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 9, 33-46 (1986);
Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93
MICH. L. REv. 485, 503-11 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking
Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1250-53 (1993); Mark
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 49-72 (1979); and Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attor-
ney-Client Relationship: The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 318-19 (1987).
3. See infra Part V. In a client-centered model, the client retains the authority over im-
portant decisions in his case.
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and the lawyer-centered 4 models of representation should immunize
the decisions of counsel from a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.' On the one hand, prosecutors call for deference to the failed
strategies of trial counsel, where the client had virtually no under-
standing or input; and on the other hand, prosecutors claim a defen-
dant waived the right to argue a certain decision was constitutionally
deficient when the client himself was the impetus for the decision.
Both a lawyer's strategy and a client's express request can conflict
with the prevailing professional norms, and, therefore, both must be
reviewed by appellate courts to determine whether certain minimum
constitutional requirements have been satisfied.6 Arguing that neither
the lawyer-centered model nor the client-centered model of represen-
tation enjoy normative force in constitutional analysis, this Article
concludes that the dignity of clients and the integrity of the Sixth
Amendment require appellate courts to step in and articulate certain
basic criteria for identifying reasonable attorney strategies and true in-
stances of client autonomy.
This Article contrasts a recent Ninth Circuit decision with a case
currently pending before the court. In the first, Summerlin v. Schriro
(Summerlin II), the court rejected the prosecution's argument that
counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence, though otherwise un-
reasonable, was constitutionally adequate because the client expressly
rejected presenting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.7 In
Correll v. Schriro (Correll I), now pending before the Ninth Circuit,
the prosecution argues that defense counsel's decision to forego pre-
senting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, without ade-
quately consulting the client, was not constitutionally deficient insofar
as deference is owed to the tactical decisions of counsel.8 The facts of
these cases provide an appropriate platform for discussing the consti-
4. See infra Part IV. In a lawyer-centered model, the lawyer selects the most appropri-
ate means of achieving the client's stated goals.
5. Compare Summerlin v. Schriro (Summerlin 11), 427 F.3d 623, 636 (9th Cir. 2005)
(in which the State argued that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be main-
tained because it was the client's instruction that a mitigation defense not be presented), with
Excerpts of the Record at 349-51, Correll v. Schriro, No. 03-99006 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 26,
2005) (where counsel argued that the decision not to present mitigation evidence reflected
counsel's strategic appraisal of the evidence best presented to the particular judge hearing the
case) [hereinafter ER].
6. Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that counsel's strategic or "tactical de-
cisions" must be afforded a particularly "wide latitude"), with Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 533 (2003) (recognizing that certain strategies are unreasonable and, therefore, subject to
constitutional scrutiny).
7. Sunmerlin II, 427 F.3d at 636, 639.
8. Correll v. Schriro (Correl 11), No. 03-99006 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 26, 2005).
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tutional significance of the client-centered and lawyer-centered mod-
els of representation. Correll II provides an opportunity to acknowl-
edge that attorney strategies and client directives only enjoy normative
constitutional force when certain conditions have been satisfied. The
holding in Summerlin II, that counsel's decision to follow his client's
request amounted to constitutionally ineffective representation, 9 may
appear in tension with client autonomy. However, this Article sug-
gests the holding is, in fact, critical to the continued viability and de-
sirability of a client-centered model of representation. Rather than a
judicial retreat from the client-centered model, Summerlin I repre-
sents an essential rejection of the cartoonish approach to client auton-
omy taken by prosecutors, who would suggest that any representation
consistent with client directives escapes constitutional review. After
Summerlin H, client autonomy, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,
minimally requires clients be adequately informed and consulted. 10
Both Summerlin II and Correll I provide the Ninth Circuit with
opportunities to extend the judicial trend in capital cases that favors
rigorous, fact-specific, constitutional inquiries over broad theoretical
frameworks. Ultimately, by contrasting the facts of Summerlin II with
those of Correll II, this Article demonstrates that superficial presenta-
tions of either the lawyer-centered or the client-centered models are
incapable of providing counsel with a constitutional escape-hatch for
otherwise deficient representation. Unreasonable errors of strategy,
whether driven by client preference or a misunderstanding of the prin-
ciples of law at issue, are strategies only in name, and under Strick-
land v. Washington, an unreasonable strategy is no strategy at all."
II. GAUGING THE ADEQUACY OF A LAWYER UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
9. Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 639-40.
10. Although this conclusion is a fairly straightforward induction from Summerlin 11 and
other Ninth Circuit cases, the holdings of these cases are also entirely consistent with emerg-
ing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area. E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000) (stating decisions by counsel not to present mitigating evidence could not be ex-
cused as a strategic decision if it was not supported by a reasonable investigation).
11. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; cf Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 895 (9th Cir.
2002) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing on whether the failure to investigate mitigating
evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel to determine "if counsel's decision was
a strategic one, and if so, whether the decision was a sufficiently informed one" (quoting
Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992))).
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Counsel for his defence."'' 2 Consistent with this requirement, states
are prohibited from incarcerating a person who has not enjoyed the as-
sistance of counsel at all stages of the criminal process where substan-
tial rights are affected. 3 Moreover, the right to assistance of counsel
has been recognized to include "the right to the effective assistance of
counsel."' 4  Not until Strickland v. Washington, however, was the
phrase "effective assistance of counsel" given a practical definition.
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced the
now familiar two-part test for determining whether a petitioner has es-
tablished a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 5
First, a petitioner must show that his counsel provided deficient per-
formance,16 a showing that is inextricably wedded to the norms of the
profession.' 7 Second, because the Court was unwilling to assume the
integrity of a proceeding was compromised whenever an attorney pro-
vided deficient performance, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel a petitioner must show that defense counsel's defi-
cient performance prejudiced him.'8
In determining whether the deficient performance prong of the
Strickland test has been satisfied, courts assess whether counsel's per-
formance was reasonable under "prevailing professional norms."' 9 In
making this determination, courts consider counsel's performance in
light of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.20 Citing the ABA
standards, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Wiggins v. Smith that
counsel's duty to investigate is particularly important in a capital sen-
tencing trial.2' Where a defendant has been convicted of a capital
crime, only through the presentation of mitigation evidence does he
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).
14. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
15. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 688; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.").
19. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
20. Id. at 524 (recognizing the ABA guidelines as "standards to which we long have re-
ferred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)).
21. Id.; see also Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
"To perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must conduct sufficient
investigation and engage in sufficient preparation to be able to 'present[] and explain[] the
significance of all the available [mitigating] evidence."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000)).
[Vol. 42
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have an opportunity to argue to the sentencer that his life should be
spared.22 In general, objectively reasonable representation at a capital
sentencing hearing requires that counsel present mitigation evidence.23
The prejudice prong in Strickland is satisfied when the attorney's
deficient performance is sufficiently egregious as to undermine the re-
viewing court's confidence in the proceeding. 24 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged a strict "outcome-determinative standard" is "not
quite appropriate. '25  Nonetheless, in order to establish prejudice the
petitioner must show there is a "reasonable probability" that the out-
come of the proceeding would have been different.26 Prejudice exists,
in short, where the challenged proceeding "cannot be relied on as hav-
ing produced a just result. 27
III. ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL AT CAPITAL SENTENCING
The protections of the Sixth Amendment apply to "all critical
stages of the criminal process. '"28 However, "[t]here is no more impor-
tant hearing in law or equity than the penalty phase of a capital trial. '29
Thus, if there is merit to the claim that certain allocations of deci-
sion-making authority are more effective than others at securing a de-
22. In order to understand the role that mitigation evidence plays in determining whether
a defendant will be sentenced to death, it is important to understand the basic structure of a
capital case.
Capital cases are bifurcated: first, the jury determines whether the defendant is
guilty of any of the offenses with which he is charged; then, if the jury has found
the defendant guilty of a capital offense, the jury decides whether the defendant
will be sentenced to death or a lesser punishment. Although the precise issues to be
determined at the penalty trial vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the penalty
jury invariably makes its sentencing determination after considering aggravating
factors introduced by the prosecution and mitigating evidence introduced by the
defense.
Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing "Innocent" Capital
Defendants, 102 MICH. L. REv. 2001, 2002 n. 1 (2004).
23. Williams, 529 U.S. at 393 (noting that a defendant has a "constitutionally protected
right-to provide the jury with.., mitigating evidence").
24. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
25. Id. at 693-94.
26. Id.; Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 718 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that
the appropriate inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that the newly discovered
mitigation evidence would have made a difference to at least one juror (quoting Douglas v.
Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003))).
27. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
28. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
170 (1985)).
29. Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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fendant's rights in an adversarial process,30 then the relative disparity
in effectiveness should be nowhere more obvious than at the capital
sentencing phase of litigation. Focusing exclusively on the sentencing
phase of capital trials, this Article concludes that generic normative
rules regarding the proper allocation of decision-making authority be-
tween the client and the attorney should be rejected in favor of more
fact-specific constitutional inquiries.
IV. TRADITIONAL LAWYER-CENTERED REPRESENTATION:
REPRESENTATION CONSISTENT WITH THIS MODEL Is NOT
IMMUNE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
The virtue of the lawyer-centered model of representation was ex-
tolled by Justice Burger in Wainwright v. Sykes3" and Jones v. Bar-
nes.32 According to Justice Burger, virtually all decision-making au-
thority and responsibility belongs to the lawyer.33 One commentator
characterized this vision of lawyer-dominance as "[m]ore than just a
guiding hand, [the lawyer] has become virtually the whole body and
brains of the defense."'  Burger understood effective representation to
require an allocation of decision-making authority such that counsel is
the "master" and the client the "servant."35
In the client-centered model, the client's role is primarily "pas-
sive. '3 6 The client is tasked with determining the general objectives of
the representation, and the lawyer selects the most appropriate means
of achieving the client's stated goal.37 It is not surprising, then, that
the model's legitimacy is derived from overtly "paternalistic assump-
tions."38 Proponents of the lawyer-centered model argue that such an
allocation of authority is justified by virtue of the lawyer's expertise
and emotional detachment. 39 A lack of sophistication on the part of
30. Strauss, supra note 2, at 340.
31. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
32. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983).
33. Id. at 750-54; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 93.
34. Berger, supra note 2, at 33.
35. Id.
36. Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between
Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions
of the Public Defender, 84 GEo. L.J. 2419, 2440 (1996).
39. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 36.
[Vol. 42
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the client and technical expertise on the part of the attorney are pre-
sumed.4" In short, the lawyer-centered allocation of authority views
the client's decision to have representation as a decision to surrender a
significant degree of control. As the California Supreme Court
bluntly put it, "[b]y choosing professional representation, the accused
surrenders all but a handful of 'fundamental' personal rights to coun-
sel's complete control of defense strategies and tactics. ' '4 1
Scholars continue to disagree about the appropriate role of the
lawyer in the lawyer-client relationship, but if the theories espoused in
support of the traditional allocation of authority are of any normative
value, then representation consistent with this paradigm could not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. That is to say, if the law-
yer-centered allocation of authority is a normative ethical theory,
courts could not view representation that is consistent with this model
to be inconsistent with the "prevailing professional norms. '42  The
Sixth Amendment, however, does not provide unchecked immunity
for attorney strategies.
In Correll II, a case now pending before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the court is reviewing the constitutionality of a strategic
decision by counsel to forego presenting any mitigation evidence at
Correll's sentencing hearing. 43 Regardless of the court's ultimate
holding in this case, for purposes of this Article, the facts of Correll H
will be used to represent a lawyer-centered strategy to forego mitiga-
tion.
A. Facts of Correll
In 1984, Michael Correll was charged with the gruesome roadside
execution of three people.' After a three-day trial, a jury found Cor-
rell guilty on all counts.45 Following his client's conviction, Correll's
attorney "submitted a brief sentencing memorandum" that devoted
"less than one page to mitigating circumstances" and failed to mention
40. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 38.
41. People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730, 741 (Cal. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
42. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (recognizing the "prevail-
ing professional norms" as the appropriate measure of attorney performance under the Sixth
Amendment).
43. Correll 1, No. 03-99006 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 26, 2005).
44. Correll v. Stewart (Correll 1), 137 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1998). This factual
narrative is largely a summary of the court's factual description in Correll's first appeal, Cor-
rell L For additional details, the reader may refer directly to the opinion.
45. Id. at 1410.
189
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"Correll's psychiatric condition at the time of the murders."4 6 More-
over, at the capital sentencing hearing, counsel made only "a passing
allusion to the fact that Correll's parents had abandoned him when he
was fourteen years old [and] made no reference to Correll's psychiat-
ric condition."47 Counsel's entire sentencing argument took only eight
transcript pages and, other than referring the court to the pre-sentence
report, consisted of no witness or other evidentiary testimony.48 In
other words, Correll's attorney presented virtually no evidence in
mitigation.4 9
Counsel's decision not to present mitigation evidence was based
on his view that the sentencing hearing in this case would be a "dog-
and-pony show.""° Correll's attorney speculated that the sentencing
judge would not be receptive to mitigation evidence that was "touchy-
feelly [sic] fuzzy-headed kind of stuff."'" At an evidentiary hearing
for Correll's habeas corpus petitions, counsel testified that he was
"basically hoping [the judge] would think it was a one-time incident
and want to give Mr. Correll a break and find a mitigating factor."52
The strategy of Correll's counsel, in other words, was to deliberately
downplay the evidence that Correll suffered from an "antisocial per-
sonality with a drug problem his whole life."5 3 Consistent with this
strategy, counsel testified that "[t]he last thing I wanted Judge Howe
to think is that Mr. Correll was permanently damaged psychologi-
cally."54 Other than evidence that may have come out during the guilt
phase trial, counsel's entire case in mitigation was the pre-sentence
report. Counsel chose this limiting strategy in the hopes of avoiding
damaging rebuttal evidence.5 6
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Compare Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(implying that the client's strategies should not be afforded deference because they are
grounded in emotion and a lack of experience), with Taylor-Thompson, supra note 38, at
2440 (noting that the lawyer-centered model of representation derives legitimacy by focusing
on the detached perspective and technical expertise of counsel).
50. ER, supra note 5, at 349-50.
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 476.
53. Id. at 353.
54. Id. at 450; see also id. at 448 ("I didn't want psychological reports coming in.").
55. Id. at 506.
56. Id. at 983. Counsel testified that he purposely excluded his client's drug addiction
from the mitigation evidence to keep out evidence of his client's antisocial personality disor-
der. Id. at 352-53. Not only did counsel fail to produce any affirmative mitigation evidence,
he failed to make any attempt to blunt, what he characterized as, the very harmful information
[Vol. 42
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After hearing the prosecution's case in aggravation, and in the ab-
sence of any rebuttal or mitigation by Correll's counsel, the sentenc-
ing judge found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating cir-
cumstances and sentenced Correll to death on each of the murder
counts." The instant pending appeal requires the court to consider
whether Correll received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result
of his lawyer's failure to present available mitigation evidence. 8
B. Sixth Amendment Analysis of Counsel's
Decision to Forego Mitigation
The Ninth Circuit has recognized a limitation on the deference
that courts are entitled to show to the strategic decisions of a defen-
dant's attorney. 9 The court has held that "an attorney's performance
is not immunized from Sixth Amendment challenges simply by at-
taching to it the label of 'trial strategy. "'I Accordingly, in determin-
ing whether Correll's counsel provided constitutionally deficient per-
formance by failing to present mitigation evidence, the court must
engage in a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry.61 The court must
consider whether counsel's strategy was sufficiently reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances so as to constitute effective assistance
of counsel.62
about Correll, in the pre-sentence report. Id at 465. Counsel testified: "I figured it was best
to leave [the information he felt was hurtful to Correll's mitigation case] alone." Id. at 466.
57. State v. Correll, 715 P.2d 721, 731-35 (Ariz. 1986).
On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Correll's convictions.
However, in its January 28, 1986 opinion, the court concluded that the trial court
had erred in determining that Correll had intended to kill Debra Rosen, and that the
aggravating circumstance stemming from the commission of "one or more other
homicides" had been wrongfully applied retroactively in Correll's sentence. Ac-
cordingly, the Arizona Supreme Court modified Correll's death sentence for the
murder of Debra Rosen to a sentence of life imprisonment and invalidated the
"other homicides" aggravating factor. After reweighing the remaining aggravating
circumstances against Correll's claimed mitigating factors, the court affirmed Cor-
rell's other three death sentences.
Correll 1, 137 F.3d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
58. The Ninth Circuit previously granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
counsel was ineffective at capital sentencing and disposed of all of Correll's other claims.
Correll 1, 137 F.3d at 1413, 1420. The instant appeal focuses on whether the district court
erred in denying relief following the evidentiary hearing. Correll If, No. 03-99006 (9th Cir.
argued Sept. 26, 2005).
59. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 83647 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing when a
lawyer's strategy should be reviewed for constitutional deficiency).
60. Id. at 846 (citing United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)).
61. See id. at 838 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
62. Id. at 846.
9
Marceau: Exploring the Intersection of Effectiveness & Autonomy in Capital
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
On remand to the district court, counsel elaborated on the strategy
he used during Correll's sentencing hearing. Counsel testified that he
did not provide any witnesses and relied exclusively on the pre-
sentence report and evidence presented at trial for his presentation of
mitigation evidence.63 Correll's attorney stated that he deliberately
avoided presenting evidence of Correll's chronic drug addiction, his
extremely troubled childhood, and his psychological problems. In
counsel's view, the best strategy was to "hope" that without a com-
plete picture of Correll's life-history the judge would treat this as a
one-time incident and give Correll a "break." 64  Counsel acknowl-
edged, however, that characterizing the crime as a one-time drug inci-
dent was not "in and of itself,... something you would find as a miti-
gating factor. '65 In essence, then, counsel's strategy amounted to a
decision not to present any mitigation evidence in the hope that the
court would not get a complete picture of Correll's background.
Because unreasonable strategies are not immune from constitu-
tional review, the court is required to second-guess the wisdom of
counsel's decision to forego mitigation evidence.66 The lawyer's
judgment gives way to certain specific constitutional duties. 67 Spe-
cifically, the duty to investigate potential mitigating evidence does not
lose force simply because counsel has strictly adhered to a lawyer-
centered model of representation. In Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme
Court held that the traditional deference owed to the strategic judg-
ments of counsel is not justified where there was not an adequate in-
vestigation "supporting those judgments. 65 This is because "it is im-
perative that all relevant mitigation information be unearthed for
consideration."'69 Accordingly, a decision by counsel not to present
mitigating evidence cannot be excused as a strategic decision unless it
is supported by reasonable investigations.70
63. ER, supra note 5, at 505-06.
64. Id. at 353.
65. Id. at 477.
66. Cf. Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting evidentiary
hearing when counsel failed to develop and introduce mitigation evidence at penalty phase
trial).
67. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (recognizing a constitutional "ob-
ligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background").
68. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521.(2003).
69. Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Caro v.
Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998)).
70. Id.
[Vol. 42
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Correll's attorney acknowledged that following Correll's convic-
tion he did virtually no additional investigation.7' Moreover, the miti-
gation evidence sought by counsel during preparation for the guilt
phase of the trial suffered from a severely misguided focus. Indicating
his significant misunderstanding of mitigation, the limited attention
that Correll's attorney paid to the development of a mitigation defense
focused exclusively on discovering evidence suggesting that Correll
was a good person and one who had done good deeds.72 Given the
limited nature and misguided focus of counsel's mitigation investiga-
tion, the decision not to present mitigation evidence cannot be charac-
terized as having been preceded by a "diligent investigation into [the]
client's troubling background and unique personal circumstances."73
The district court acknowledged that counsel failed to adequately
investigate the potentially available mitigation evidence in this case,
but excused the failure on account of counsel's articulated strategy.74
The district court concluded that counsel's decision not to investigate
potentially mitigating evidence was consistent with his general mitiga-
tion strategy, which focused on not opening the door to damaging re-
buttal evidence from the prosecution.75 In counsel's view, it was a
waste of time to investigate and develop the available mitigation evi-
dence regarding Correll's past in light of the damaging rebuttal evi-
dence he knew existed.76 Under the Sixth Amendment, a failure by
counsel to conduct diligent mitigation investigations can only be ex-
71. E.g., ER, supra note 5, at 446-47. Counsel testified that he only saw his client
"definitely one time that I can recall, but I think two or three times." Id. at 446. He also testi-
fied that he could not recall that his investigator performed any additional work, nor did coun-
sel file a motion to assess the defendant's mental condition prior to sentencing. Id. at 446-47.
72. E.g., id. at 481 (counsel explained his sentencing strategy, "[b]asically it was just
hoping that Judge Howe liked Mr. Correll"). The most effective form of mitigation evidence,
which Correll's counsel completely ignored, is that which portrays the defendant as "a person
whose moral sense was warped by abuse, drugs, [and] mental incapacity." Allen v. Wood-
ford, 395 F.3d 979, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, in Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117,
1135 (9th Cir. 2002), the court recognized that it is not the positive aspects, such as good
deeds, of the defendant's life and character that will move a sentencer to spare the defendant's
life.
73. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 415 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. ER, supra note 5, at 1016.
75. Id.
76. The record confirms that there was significant rebuttal evidence that may have been
presented by the prosecution had counsel opted to present certain mitigating evidence. See id.
at 981 n. 15. For example, there is evidence in the record that Correll had engaged in an inces-
tuous relationship with his younger sister. Id. at 1058. The district court placed significant
emphasis on the existence of such rebuttal evidence. Id. at 1016. However, it is worth noting
that although there was significant rebuttal evidence available, there is no indication that the
government was aware of this evidence, much less prepared to present it at the sentencing
hearing.
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cused by "a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary."77 In other words, though otherwise deficient represen-
tation will not give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
where the attorney's decisions were consistent with a reasonable strat-
egy, it is a bit circular to suggest that an unreasonable investigation,
one that is less than diligent, could give rise to a reasonable strategy.78
The appropriate inquiry, therefore, requires the court to assess the rea-
sonableness of counsel's strategy in light of the totality of counsel's
limited investigation and the scope of the rebuttal evidence available
to the prosecution.
The question of whether the rebuttal evidence was, as the district
court characterized it, so "overwhelming" as to justify counsel's fail-
ure to investigate and present mitigation evidence presents a fairly
close question of law as to whether Strickland's prejudice prong is sat-
isfied in this case.79  Nonetheless, the first prong of Strickland,
whether Correll received representation consistent with the prevailing
norms of the legal profession, requires the court to engage in a consti-
tutional inquiry regarding the adequacy of the strategy and investiga-
tion, regardless of whether it was a counsel-made strategy. In short,
certain ethical responsibilities-for example, the duty to investigate
and present mitigation-take an ethical and constitutional front seat to
concerns as to whether the allocation of decision-making authority
was traditional or client-centered.
In this case, even if counsel's investigation had been reasonable,
the failure to present mitigation cannot be characterized as a strategic
decision deserving of deference. Correll's attorney articulated his fear
of rebuttal evidence as the basis for his strategy to forego mitigation; 80
however, Correll was sentenced in Arizona. 8 Under Arizona law, if
any aggravating factors were proven, a death sentence was mandatory
unless mitigating evidence that was "sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency" was presented. 82 Despite the abundance of available classic
77. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
78. See Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing counsel's per-
formance as constitutionally deficient when he "failed to conduct even the minimal investiga-
tion that would have enabled him to come to an informed decision" (quoting Sanders v.
Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994))); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456,
2462 (2005).
79. ER, supra note 5, at 1016.
80. Id. at 983.
81. See Correll 1, 137 F.3d 1404, 1408, 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
82. ARIz. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (2005); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 652 (1990) (recognizing that § 13-703 is not "impermissibly 'mandatory"' insofar as it
[Vol. 42
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mitigation evidence concerning family history, abuse, physical im-
pairments, and mental disorders, Correll's attorney failed to present
any mitigating evidence.83 Counsel's representation, which virtually
assured his client a sentence of death, cannot be characterized as a
reasonable strategic choice.'
Accordingly, in reviewing a trial decision that is the product of a
lawyer-centered model of decision-making authority, courts are pro-
hibited by the Constitution from affording such a decision normative
force. Lawyer-centered tactics are entitled to substantial deference,
but where the attorney's approach to the case is not reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances or applicable law, a claim for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel exists.85 The general justifications in sup-
port of a lawyer-centered model of representation do not, in other
words, say anything about the reasonableness, and therefore constitu-
tionality, of a particular strategy.
V. CLIENT-CENTERED REPRESENTATION: THE IDEAL OF CLIENT-
AUTONOMY, IF INTERPRETED Too BROADLY, MAY CONFLICT WITH A
CLIENT' S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Central to the debate about the appropriate allocation of decision-
making authority is a call for an acknowledgement of the client's dig-
nity interest.86 One of the first vocal advocates for a more client-
centered allocation of the decision-making authority was Justice
Brennan.87 In Justice Brennan's view, "[t]he right to defend is per-
sonal, ' 88 and, therefore, ethical representation requires that the defen-
dant retain "ultimate authority" over all important decisions regarding
his case and not simply the "most basic structure" of his case.89 In
other words, Brennan acknowledged that in most cases it would be
wise for the defendant to defer to counsel's judgment, but points out
that the Constitution "does not require clients to be wise, and other
policies should be weighed in the balance as well." 90
permits the sentencer to consider any type of mitigating evidence), overruled on other
grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
83. See, e.g., ER, supra note 5, at 482-91.
84. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
86. Strauss, supra note 2, at 315-17.
87. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 758 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
89. Id. at 758-59.
90. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
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The function of the client-centered movement is overtly moral; its
interest in "maximiz[ing] client autonomy" 9 is born out of a perceived
need to avoid leaving defendants "to believe that the law contrives
against [them]."'  Commentators had begun to realize that "the legal
aid system (like the welfare system, the public housing system and
other government-funded social services that preceded it) may be sup-
porting the very inequalities that brought a federally financed legal aid
program into being." 93 The traditional, lawyer-centered model's deni-
gration of the client's autonomy was, in other words, identified as
"one of the many indignities visited upon someone who has the ill for-
tune to run afoul of the criminal justice system."' Consistent with
this view, scholars suggested that the traditional allocation of authority
works such an indignity upon the client as, quite often, to render effec-
tive representation virtually impossible. 95
In sum, under the client-centered model of representation, counsel
has an ethical obligation to allow the client to make "all fundamental
decisions that are likely to have a substantial" effect on the case.
96
That is to say, the client's "choices should be respected unless they
would require [the] lawyers to violate their consciences, the law, or
their duties to the court."97
Given the ethical thrust of the client-centered approach, there is a
sort of intuitive appeal to the idea that a client who unequivocally ex-
presses his wishes cannot later complain that representation consistent
with his wishes amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The
decision of whether or not to present mitigation evidence at one's
capital sentencing hearing is unquestionably a fundamental decision,
and prosecutors have eagerly pointed out the autonomy issues at stake
91. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 36, at 8.
92. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (1975)).
93. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, NLADA
BRIEFCASE, Oct. 1976, 106, 108. Bellow, a pioneer of the idea of clinical legal education and
of client-centered representation, recognized that differences in education, disposition, and
socio-economic class make the lawyer-client relationship inherently tenuous. See generally
id.
94. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id ("I cannot accept the
notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person receives merely for being accused of
a crime."). Justice Brennan, for example, predicates his support for client-centered represen-
tation on the view that counsel's most important function "is to protect the dignity and auton-
omy of a person on trial." Id. at 759.
95. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 340.
96. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 36, at 8.
97. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in failing to bind a defendant to his express directives.9" But the dig-
nity interests inherent in the client-centered model of representation
are absent from the superficial version of the model advanced by
prosecutors, who argue that a client's directive relieves counsel from
the duties to investigate and consult. Although a client may suggest a
particular course of action, such as foregoing mitigation, certain duties
of the lawyer are "virtually absolute," as the Court concluded in Sum-
merlin H.99 Thus, unreasonable deference to the requests of the client
is incompatible with the Sixth Amendment's representational guaran-
tees. Counsel's failure to adhere to these absolutes, whether the prod-
uct of "overbroad acquiescence" to client demands or an otherwise un-
reasonable strategy, gives rise to a claim for constitutionally
ineffective counsel.l°° Accordingly, the prosecutors' urging of a sort
of absolute autonomy is inconsistent with a true respect for the dignity
and autonomy of defendants and is, therefore, also inconsistent with
one's right to effective assistance of counsel.
A. Summerlin: Counsel Defers to the Client's Express Wishes
The circumstances surrounding Warren Summerlin's conviction
have been aptly characterized as stranger than legal fiction. 10' Al-
though a Supreme Court reversal of a Ninth Circuit grant of habeas
corpus relief in a capital case is becoming less and less newsworthy,
the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in
this case truly is "unthinkable in a society that considers itself both
decent and rational."'0 2 Not only was Summerlin sentenced to death
98. See, e.g., Appellee's Brief at 22-23, Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2002)
(No. 99-99009), 2000 WL 33981109 (arguing that counsel was not engaging in "state assisted
suicide," but rather, respecting his client's wishes when he simply limited his investigation to
the "narrow walls [Silva] had imposed"); see also id. at 25 (indicating that given his instruc-
tions to counsel, "Silva may not now fault his counsel for constitutionally inadequate investi-
gation" (citing Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889 (1 1th Cir. 1985))). "When a defendant
preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of
ineffectiveness can be made." Mitchell, 762 F.2d at 889.
99. Summerlin H, 427 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Silva, 279 F.3d at 840).
100. Silva, 279 F.3d at 846.
101. Summerlin v. Stewart (Summerlin 1), 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
("truth is often stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense" (quoting Mark
Twain)).
102. Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
[E]xecuting people because their cases came too early-because their appeals
ended before the Supreme Court belatedly came to the realization that it had made
a grievous constitutional error in its interpretation of death penalty law, that it had
erred when it failed to recognize that the United States Constitution prohibits
judges, rather than jurors, from making critical factual decisions regarding life and
death in capital cases-is surely arbitrariness that surpasses all bounds.
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under a judge-centered system of sentencing that has since been
deemed unconstitutional, 10 3 but the case involved "an anonymous psy-
chic tip, a romantic encounter [between the public defender and the
prosecutor] that jeopardized a plea agreement, an allegedly incompe-
tent defense, and a death sentence imposed by a purportedly drug-
addled judge.""°4
For purposes of considering the interplay between the ethical con-
cerns of client autonomy and the constitutional dictates of the Sixth
Amendment, this Article reviews the most recent Ninth Circuit en
banc opinion in Summerlin I. °I On remand from the Supreme Court,
the en banc court of the Ninth Circuit considered, again, whether
Summerlin was eligible for post-conviction relief, this time on account
of having "received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sen-
tencing phase of his capital trial in violation of his rights under the
Sixth Amendment."°6
Summerlin's ineffective assistance claim turned on the signifi-
cance of the requests he made to his attorney during the sentencing
phase of his trial. Based on the facts of this case, the court correctly
concluded that Summerlin's directives to his attorney were not truly
autonomous, and therefore the representation he received was consti-
tutionally deficient.1 7 Although the Summerlin H decision does not
go as far as it should toward discrediting the notion that representation
consistent with a client's uninformed wishes is immune from Sixth
Amendment review, the opinion lays a critical foundation for distin-
Id.
103. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89(2002).
104. Summerlin I, 341 F.3d at 1084.
105. The case has a truly tortured history. In 1983, the Arizona Supreme Court denied
Summerlin's habeas corpus petition. State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983). In
2001, a divided federal appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part the federal district
court's denial of Summerlin's habeas corpus petition. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926
(9th Cir. 2001) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the state trial judge was
competent when he deliberated on whether to impose the death penalty). Then, before the
mandate issued on the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Ring, 536 U.S. 584 (holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applied to a finding of aggravated circumstances in
death penalty sentencing). The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, "upheld Summerlin's convic-
tion, but.., held that Ring applied retroactively so as to require that the penalty of death im-
posed upon Summerlin be vacated." Summerlin H, 427 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2005). The
Supreme Court partially granted Summerlin's writ of certiorari and reversed Summerlin I,
holding that Ring did not apply retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358
(2004).
106. Summerlin 11, 427 F.3d at 628. The Ninth Circuit did not reach any other issues
raised because it reversed the district court on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 643-44.
107. See id. at 638-40.
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guishing uninformed instructions from true autonomy. The opinion
also recognized that deference to a client's wishes does not, without
more, render representation immune from constitutional scrutiny. 108
"Summerlin's attorney did not present any mitigating evidence
during the" capital sentencing hearing of Summerlin's trial."° At one
point, Summerlin's attorney attempted to call a psychiatrist to the
stand to testify about Summerlin's mental disorders, but "before the
witness could be sworn in, Summerlin interrupted" and told his attor-
ney not to present the witness.' "0 Following Summerlin's interruption,
"[c]ounsel requested a five-minute recess.""' Immediately after the
recess, counsel informed the court that "[w]ith the consent of the De-
fendant, the Defendant has no witnesses in mitigation at this time
and.., we'll rest.""' 2 Counsel concluded by noting that Summerlin
would rest his case in mitigation on the pre-sentence report.113
In stark contrast to the decision not to present mitigation evidence
in Correll's case, counsel's decision not to present available mitigating
evidence in Summerlin's case was, to some extent, a result of Sum-
merlin's express wishes."4 As discussed below, Summerlin may not
have understood exactly what his request entailed,"5 but it is undis-
puted that Summerlin objected to his counsel's attempt to present cer-
108. Because the court understood the factual context of the case as providing an inde-
pendent basis for rejecting the government's claim that Summerlin's waiver of mitigation
evidence deprived him of the right to complain on appeal that he received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, the opinion appears at times to leave the door open for the government to
assert that a complete waiver of mitigation, whether informed or not, could satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. See id. at 637 ("there is no record of [exactly] what Summerlin said, much less
that he instructed his attorney not to present any penalty phase defense whatsoever") (empha-
sis added). However, the court's ultimate holding is unequivocal. "[Elven if Summerlin had
instructed counsel not to present a mitigation defense, that fact would have no effect on the
deficient conduct prong of Strickland." Id. at 638.
109. Id. at 634.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the trial transcript).
113. Id. at 635.
114. Compare Correll 1, 137 F.3d 1404, 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1998) (where counsel's
strategy included only a five minute meeting with his client between the jury verdict and the
pre-sentencing hearing and the presentation of only a single page of mitigating circumstances
in preparation for the hearing), with Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 637 (where the attorney's at-
tempt to put on mitigation evidence was thwarted by his client's directives not to call any
mitigation witnesses).
115. For example, Summerlin almost certainly was not aware of "'the belief, long held by
this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who
have no such excuse."' Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 (1990) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)).
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tain mitigation evidence on his behalf." 6 In light of the sentencing
judge's technical description of the purpose of the hearing, Summer-
lin's waiver of mitigation can fairly be characterized as express and
unequivocal. 117
The practical effect of adhering to Summerlin's request was, of
course, to leave the sentencing judge with no affirmative mitigation
evidence and no evidence to rebut the aggravating factors presented
by the State. Similar to Correll, Summerlin was sentenced in Ari-
zona," 8 where the death penalty is mandatory when the defendant has
a qualifying prior conviction and substantial mitigating evidence is not
presented to the sentencer.119 In Summerlin's case, the State presented
evidence of Summerlin's prior conviction. 2 ° Accordingly, counsel's
decision to forego mitigation evidence, whether the product of his
own strategy or that of Summerlin, made a sentence of death all but
certain. 121
B. Uninformed Decisions Are Not Consistent with the Autonomy of
the Client-Centered Model and Are Not
Entitled to Constitutional Deference
Although presaged by dicta in recent Supreme Court cases,12 2 the
Summerlin II court's rejection of the argument that uninformed client
requests can trump the most basic guarantees of the Sixth Amendment
serves as a new, valuable model for commentators and courts across
the country grappling with the parameters of the Sixth Amendment's
116. See Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 634-37.
117. Not only did Summerlin oppose his counsel's decision to present a particular mitiga-
tion witness, when the sentencing judge asked him whether he wished to "present any mitiga-
tion witnesses" (or evidence), Summerlin seems to have confirmed that he did not. Id at 637.
The judge, addressing Summerlin directly, stated,
[I want] to make sure that ... you understand that you are facing a potential deci-
sion between either fife imprisonment or the death penalty, and this is the time in
which you must decide whether you present any mitigation witnesses on your be-
half.
This is your entitlement. Your lawyer has told me that at this time you do not wish
to, and he is telling me that you do not wish to call any mitigation witnesses. If
this is correct I'll accept your decision. But I want it to be very clear that this is
the time, and only time, that you'll be able to have to do this.
Id. (quoting the trial transcript).
118. Id. at 627.
119. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (2005); see also Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631,
637 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that under Arizona law, once a qualifying prior conviction is
shown a death sentence is "inevitable" in the absence of mitigating evidence).
120. Summerlin H, 427 F.3d at 634.
121. Id. at 640.
122. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005).
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protections in the face of a renewed ethical interest in respecting client
autonomy. An uninformed directive by the client requesting his attor-
ney to forego mitigation is not, in most cases, a true exercise of free
will. The court in Summerlin H was correct to conclude that an attor-
ney who has failed to investigate and develop mitigation and consult
and educate his client is not insulated from Sixth Amendment scru-
tiny, even in the face of an unequivocal client directive. After Sum-
merlin II, the hallmark for reviewing a client directive is whether the
client had the benefit of diligent investigation, adequate information,
and dutiful consultation before making the crucial decision. The
court's refusal to foreclose constitutional claims where these elements
are missing12 will have important repercussions for lawyers who seek
to avoid blame for their deficient performance and judges who seek to
enforce death sentences under the guise of respecting client-driven de-
cisions.
The implicit holding in Summerlin H is a recognition that a lawyer
who adheres to his client's uninformed or unknowing decision, at least
in the context of a capital trial, is facilitating deficient representation,
not client autonomy. 124 Autonomy in the absence of information and
consultation suffers upon the defendant indignities at least as severe as
those associated with the traditional, lawyer-centered model of repre-
sentation and is entitled to no greater deference than that traditionally
afforded to counsel under Strickland.
The holding in Summerlin II, while of profound importance to the
emerging body of Sixth Amendment case law reviewing client deci-
sions, is a logical extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly "declined to articulate specific guidelines
for appropriate attorney conduct,"'2" but, at least in the context of
capital sentencing hearings, the Court's "reasonableness" analysis is
increasingly willing to recognize certain "norms" of adequate repre-
sentation.1 26 In Rompilla v. Beard, for example, the Supreme Court
suggested that the "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms" 1 27 standard in Strickland may give rise to a "few hard-edged
rules." 128 Specifically, Justice Souter, writing for a majority of the
Court, recognized normative constitutional force in the duty to con-
123. See Summerlin H, 427 F.3d at 639-40.
124. Id. at 638-39.
125. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
126. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
127. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
128. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
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duct "adequate investigation."'' 2 9 Though the Court recognized that a
fairly limited investigation may be appropriate in certain cases, the
Court held that the duty to investigate and review the material counsel
knows the prosecution is relying on in support of its case in aggrava-
tion is so fundamental that the failure to do so by counsel, even when
the defendant was "actively obstructive," constitutes deficient per-
formance. 30
Taking this one significant step further, the court in Summerlin H
recognized not just a duty on the part of counsel to review the material
that the prosecution will rely on as evidence of aggravation, but a duty
to investigate and, in most cases, present available "classic mitigation
evidence.' 13' The court in Summerlin H concluded that, at the very
least, counsel must provide his client with the opportunity to make a
fully informed and intelligent decision about the presentation of miti-
gating evidence. 132 This requires thoroughly investigating and devel-
oping the available classic mitigation evidence and educating the cli-
ent about the function of mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing
hearing. 133 This dramatically refines the concept of respecting client
directives, one that forecloses attempts to bind the client to a superfi-
cial exercise of autonomy. And while the court had extremely favor-
able facts in Summerlin H, which allowed it to carve out a rather nar-
row holding, the thrust of the court's analysis and the implication for
criminal attorneys is obvious: a trial strategy based on an "overbroad
acquiescence" to the uninformed decisions of a client can give rise to
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel."' 4 In this case,
counsel's decision to forego mitigation was not insulated from consti-
tutional review because counsel failed to adhere to certain minimum
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2462, 2464, 2467 ("Rompilla was even actively obstructive by sending coun-
sel off on false leads.").
131. Summerlin II, 427 F.3d 623, 634-35. (9th Cir. 2005) The Summerlin H court noted
that "there was an abundance of available classic mitigation evidence concerning family his-
tory, abuse, physical impairments, and mental disorders." Id. at 635.
132. Id. at 638 (emphasizing that in capital cases counsel has a "duty to render 'extraor-
dinary efforts"' (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-1.2(c) (2d ed. 1980))); see
also Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a duty on the part of
counsel to try to persuade defendant to present mitigating evidence).
133. Summerlin 11, 427 F.3d at 638.
134. The Court had previously recognized the problem of "overbroad acquiescence" in a
three-judge panel opinion, Silva, 279 F.3d at 846. Summerlin H is the first en banc decision
of the Ninth Circuit, and all other circuits, recognizing that deference to client directives can
constitute constitutionally deficient representation. Clarifying the holding from another three-
judge opinion, Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir. 1993), Summerlin H holds that
only where the defendant's autonomous decisions as to trial strategy are "informed and know-
ing," will the representation be immune from habeas review. Summerlin H, 427 F.3d at 638.
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duties that ensure that the lawyer-client relationship is characterized
by reasonableness.
The first of counsel's constitutional errors is so fundamental that
virtually no failing trial strategy could be excused; the record in Sum-
merlin H leaves no doubt that counsel failed to investigate potential
mitigating evidence. "He conducted no investigation of Summerlin's
family and social history.... His development of a mental health de-
fense was based solely on the limited information developed at Sum-
merlin's pre-trial competency examination...". . 3" This failure is par-
ticularly troubling where there existed a wealth of available classic
mitigation evidence. Had counsel conducted a reasonable investiga-
tion, he would have discovered mitigation evidence concerning family
history, abuse, physical impairments, and mental disorders. 36 Neither
the district court that denied Summerlin's habeas petition, nor the
government lawyers who opposed the Ninth Circuit's decision to
grant habeas relief, contended that counsel's failure to investigate or
consult his client was supported by a strategic reason. 3 7 Rather, in
opposing Summerlin's request for relief, the government generally fo-
cused on the fact that Summerlin himself expressly opposed his attor-
ney's attempts to offer what little mitigation evidence he was prepared
to present. 3 8 Counsel's failure to investigate deprived Summerlin of
the opportunity to assess his options and make an informed decision
about whether or not to avoid a death sentence by presenting the
abundance of available classic mitigation evidence.
Another principal duty that counsel cannot "strategically" forego
simply because the client, and even his family, opposes a case in miti-
gation is the duty to review the evidence counsel knows the State will
produce to support its case in aggravation. 13 9 In Summerlin's case,
counsel was aware of the fact that the State planned to call two psy-
chiatrists during the sentencing phase but "did not contact or interview
either of them."'" A failure by counsel to investigate evidence that
counsel knows the State will use is "an obvious" sign that the repre-
135. Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 631.
136. Id.
137. See generally id.
138. Id. at 636.
139. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-66 (2005).
140. Summerlin 11, 427 F.3d at 632.
21
Marceau: Exploring the Intersection of Effectiveness & Autonomy in Capital
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
sentation was deficient, 14' because such a failure deprives the client of
a meaningful opportunity to exercise his autonomy.
142
An additional consideration which suggested that Summerlin's
decision to forego mitigation was not the product of a dignified
autonomous relationship is the absence of adequate consultation be-
tween Summerlin and his attorney. 143 During the month between the
trial and the sentencing phase, "Summerlin's attorney never once met
with his client."'" The failure of Summerlin's counsel to "commit[]
to a counseling process"'45 effectively deprived Summerlin of the op-
portunity to make an informed and knowing decision as to whether he
wished to present mitigating evidence. Without consultation or com-
plete information, Summerlin's decision to forego mitigation, no mat-
ter how broadly he stated it,'" cannot fairly be characterized as an
autonomous act deserving deviation from the normal requirements
imposed on counsel by the Sixth Amendment.
Under the guise of respecting the free will and autonomy of
criminal defendants, the State argued that counsel's representational
failures are of no consequence in light of Summerlin's directives. In
the State's view, counsel's failure to investigate, to consult with
Summerlin, and to present mitigation evidence are not "relevant be-
cause Summerlin requested that mitigating evidence not be presented
in his defense." ' 14  However, the very failures that render counsel's
performance constitutionally deficient in this case render Summerlin's
request that mitigation evidence not be presented uninformed and
therefore ineffectual. ' 48 In circumstances such as these, counsel's fail-
141. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2464.
142. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 36, at 8-10 (recognizing that true autonomy requires the
attorney to gather all "meaningful information so as to empower" the client to make decisions
through an informed "counseling process").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1983).
144. Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 633.
145. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 36, at 8.
146. As noted previously, supra note 108, because there is no record that Summerlin ex-
plicitly instructed his attorney not to present any penalty phase defense whatsoever, the court
relies in part on Summerlin's spontaneous reaction, which cannot constitute an unequivocal
direction not to conduct any penalty phase defense. Summerlin I1, 427 F.3d at 637. However,
following the judge's colloquy with Summerlin, the record leaves little doubt that, while un-
knowing and uninformed, Summerlin unequivocally chose to waive mitigation. Id.
147. Summerlin II, 427 F.3d at 636.
148. The Summerlin II court also makes a very astute observation with regards to the due
process concerns that are at issue when a capital defendant expresses his desire to forego
mitigation.
If a client has elected to forego legal proceedings that could avert the imposition of
the death penalty, then a court must make [a] determination "whether he has ca-
pacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to con-
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ure to present any mitigation or other rebuttal evidence cannot be
characterized as a reasoned tactic on the basis of the prosecution's car-
toonish sketch of client autonomy. 14 9
The Summerlin H decision enshrined the view that, consistent
with respect for true autonomy, a lawyer must ensure that a client's
decision to forego mitigation is "informed and knowing." ''  The ab-
sence of adequate investigation or consultation regarding mitigation
absolutely deprives the client of the ability to make an educated deci-
sion and renders counsel's representation constitutionally inade-
quate.'51 To the delight of the client-centered movement, which had
suffered from a distortion to the concept of autonomy, and to the
benefit of criminal defendants, the court in Summerlin H recognized
representation as constitutionally deficient when an attorney follows a
client's advice to forego presenting mitigation evidence without mak-
ing "a serious attempt to educate [the client] about the consequences
of [the] decision." '152
The propriety of refining and safeguarding client autonomy was
of particular importance in Summerlin H. Under applicable Arizona
law, Summerlin's decision to forego presenting mitigation evidence
mandated a death sentence.'53 Although counsel knew the prosecution
planned to present the court with aggravating factors, counsel failed to
investigate available mitigation and rebuttal evidence. Without the
benefit of investigation typically required under the Sixth Amend-
ment, and in the absence of any meaningful effort by counsel to in-
form Summerlin about the consequences of his action, it was impossi-
ble for Summerlin to make an "'informed and knowing' decision not
tinuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffer-
ing from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his
capacity in the premises."
Id. at 639 (quoting Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966)).
149. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A defendant's insis-
tence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel's duty to
investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of
failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant's decision regard-
ing such evidence is informed and knowing." (citing Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838
(9th Cir. 2002))).
150. Summerlin 11, 427 F.3d at 639 (quoting Silva, 279 F.3d at 840).
151. See Silva, 279 F.3d at 838.
152. Id. at 841; see also Summerlin 1I, 427 F.3d at 639 (concluding that "even when faced
with client directives limiting the scope of [the] defense, an attorney 'must conduct a reason-
able investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his
client' (quoting Silva, 279 F.3d at 846)).
153. "[T]he failure to present a mitigation defense all but assured the imposition of a
death sentence under Arizona law." Summerlin 11, 427 F.3d at 640.
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to put on any mitigating evidence."' 5 4 Accordingly, arguments that a
defendant waives his right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel by expressing his uninformed and ill-advised decision not to
present mitigation evidence, such as those made by the State in this
case, should be viewed as effectively foreclosed.
Summerlin II serves as an important reminder that respecting a de-
fendant's autonomy requires more than blind deference to the individ-
ual's wishes. Philosophers have generally defined the desirability of
autonomy in terms of the ability to make decisions in such a way as to
be free from manipulative and distorting forces.'55 But there can be
little doubt that a defendant who has just endured a capital trial and a
guilty conviction is, without meaningful investigation and consultation
by counsel, immersed in a body of manipulative and distorting forces
which deprive many of the client's choices of their autonomous char-
acter. It is important to acknowledge that the inherent dignity of the
client requires courts to avoid the temptation to equate autonomy with
the uninformed decision of an indigent client. To do otherwise would
relegate autonomy to the status of a convenient escape hatch through
which otherwise deficient representation is immunized from review.
VI. CONCLUSION
An unchecked lawyer-centered strategy threatens to divest from
defendants their traditional constitutional protection against objec-
tively unreasonable strategies. Likewise, insulating from constitu-
tional review representation that accords with client directives denies
a reviewing court the opportunity to ascertain whether the decision
was the product of a reasoned and consultative process-truly
autonomous. Neither a lawyer's strategy nor a client's directives are
entitled to such deference under the Sixth Amendment.
Certain trial decisions, whether made at the urging of the client or
the impetus of the lawyer, will not satisfy the Sixth Amendment. It is
important for courts to carry on the tradition of Summerlin II and rec-
ognize that certain fundamental constitutional mandates trump generic
154. Silva, 279 F.3d at 846 n.16 (quoting Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1197 (9th Cir.
1993)). A client's informed decision to forego mitigation over the objections of an attorney
who was prepared to present such evidence does not support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1198.
155. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, Feb. 1976, at 23. Dworkin recognizes a lack of personal autonomy wherever one has
"been influenced in decisive ways by others in such a fashion that we are not prepared to
think of it as his own choice." Id. at 25.
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considerations of strategy or autonomy. This is not to suggest that cli-
ent autonomy is not of paramount importance. But deferring to
autonomy exercised without critical information, just like deferring to
a strategy developed without investigation, results in a cursory, if not
nefarious, review of a defendant's bedrock rights under the Sixth
Amendment.
The presentation of mitigation evidence at a capital sentencing
hearing is a matter of life or death. For this reason, courts generally
agree that in the absence of reasonable tactical considerations, "[t]he
failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a
capital case ...constitutes deficient performance."' 5 6 This Article
discussed two scenarios where, in defense of the trial lawyer's repre-
sentation, the State argued that constitutionally defensible justifica-
tions existed for counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence. On
the one hand, counsel's decision in Correll H to forego mitigation is
defended insofar as deference is owed to the independent strategic de-
terminations of counsel. On the other hand, Summerlin's counsel's
failure to present mitigation is defended on the grounds that Summer-
lin expressly requested that mitigating evidence not be presented in his
defense. Neither scenario, however, presents a viable route for by-
passing certain constitutional mandates, such as the duties to investi-
gate and consult.
First, under the traditional, lawyer-centered allocation of decision-
making authority, counsel is not excused from using a reasoned strat-
egy when deciding whether to present mitigation evidence. An unin-
vestigated and, therefore, uninformed strategy is inherently unreason-
able. 157 Accordingly, although the lawyer-centered model of
representation stresses that the attorney should control the "means" of
obtaining the client's stated objectives, this approach to representation
"does not relieve an attorney of the duty to investigate potential de-
fenses, consult with the client, and provide advice as to the risks and
potential consequences of any fundamental trial decision." 158 In short,
the lawyer-centered model of representation does not in and of itself
constitute a "prevailing professional norm[]"'' 59 that could insulate trial
counsel's performance from otherwise cognizable Sixth Amendment
challenges.
156. Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999).
157. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).
158. Summerlin I, 427 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2005).
159. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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Likewise, "overbroad acquiescence" to the client's demands does
not insulate an attorney's performance from constitutional scrutiny. 160
In the absence of reasonable investigation and consultation, the ideal
of client autonomy may conflict with the client's right to effective as-
sistance of counsel. 61 Only where a defendant's decision is the prod-
uct of a reasoned and considered consultation process will a defen-
dant's decision to limit his mitigation defense be sustained under the
Sixth Amendment. 162
As the two cases discussed in this Article illustrate, whether coun-
sel forgoes mitigation because he thinks it is in the best interest of his
client or because it is what the client wants, this decision remains sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny. A lawyer-centered strategy that is not
based on a sufficiently thorough investigation and a reasonable view
of the law will give rise to a claim of deficient representation. Simi-
larly, the cartoonish vision of the client-centered model presented by
state prosecutors, which calls for unchecked deference to a client's un-
informed decisions, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of the
lawyer's role. Summerlin H is an important evolution in the Ninth
Circuit's growing body of case law regarding a lawyer's decision to
forego mitigation. Summerlin H rejects notions of client-centered rep-
resentation that rest on empty conceptions of autonomy and simulta-
neously confirms that representation consistent with the traditional
model of lawyering is not immune from review.
In light of the holding of Summerlin H, the concept of client
autonomy has achieved a status that is, at once, consistent with the
core beliefs of its leading proponents and the basic requirements of the
Constitution. In short, Summerlin II is not in tension with the true no-
tion of client autonomy advanced by the client-centered model; it is
simply a rejection of the false model of autonomy advanced by prose-
cutors seeking to bind capital defendants to their uninformed and un-
knowing trial decisions. After Summerlin II, counsel's duty to inves-
tigate, consult, and educate is more firmly entrenched than ever, and
the importance of true client autonomy is reaffirmed.
160. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 846 (9th Cir. 2002).
161. See supra Part V.B.
162. See Sunmerlin H, 427 F.3d at 638-39.
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